During the intense political upheaval that dominated the middle decades of the twentieth century, modem states intensified their drives to discipline broad sectors of society and ensure their political reliability. Subjected to such pressures, scientific institutions faced the challenge of admitting new, officially mandated criteria into the regulation of scientific life. We examine the effects of these policies on the
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between state power and professional autonomy has long constituted a major theme in the history of science. Throughout the eras of turmoil that defined their respective nations' politics from the 1930s through the 1950s, the states in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States became obsessively, at times paranoically, preoccupied with defining and adjudicating their citizens' political, ethnic, or moral acceptability. These concerns frequently resulted in purges from scientific institutions of persons deemed undesirable: "non-Aryans," communists, and socialists in National Socialist Germany; "bourgeois experts" and "cosmopolites" in Stalinist Russia; "communist sympathizers" and "subversives" in cold war America. Purges of this kind have often been understood as morality plays, with an understandable emphasis on the victimization of the innocent by the repressive state. In what follows, we attempt to broaden the discussion by going beyond the phenomenon of purges as such. Instead, we examine changes in the rules for inclusion in, and locally in individual institutes."'2 On the eighth, Telschow wrote to Glum and to Planck that the situation did not require shortening their vacations. Although at some universities "action committees" were being formed among "subordinate persons such as technical assistants," this was not yet the case for any KWIs, and after the initial hubbub in Heidelberg "all the gentlemen were quietly going about their work." Cranach agreed.'3 Others were not so calm. The director of the Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, Fritz Haber, a Jewish scientist with a wartime service exemption, proposed that the society press for the appointment of a "steward" to guide the process rather than waiting for the government to deliver a fait accompli. Telschow rejected this idea as being a formal concession of authority to what he described as a "state commissar."4 Although Planck received more than one concerned message from Haber, as well as from other KWG personnel, he did not return to Berlin until early May. 15 Throughout this critical initial period, Haber continued to dissent conspicuously from the KWG administration's response to the law,'6 yet the administrators strove to protect the director himself from its effects. Haber's was, in fact, one of the cases in which the administration clearly identified the integrity of the institution with the work of a key individual who should be kept in place if at all possible, even if this meant implementing the state's exclusionary demands in general. Following the uproar in Heidelberg, Cranach met with an Education Ministry official and found him possibly willing to retain "leading scholars" who were Jewish-but only under certain stringent conditions. In the case of Fritz Haber, his Jewish subordinates would have to be dismissed immediately. When he telephoned Haber with this information, however, Cranach received the impression that the director would "create certain difficulties."'7 Although Haber did arrange for the departure of many staff members, on May 31 he submitted his resignation, effective in September, grounding his decision in an unwillingness to change his standards for the selection of his professional associates. Haber's resignation under pressure became one of the most notorious manifestations of the Nazis' anti-Semitic policies-his subsequent death in exile contributed to the sense of tragedy. In its response to the Haber situation, the administration-which sought to be the mediator between the scientific community and the state-revealed its key assumptions about how best to manage the state-science relationship.
From the administration's perspective, Haber's attitude amounted to a kind of institutional suicide. The subsequent events at the Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry seemed to bear out the administration's conception of the ill effects of noncooperation. For the administration, these would be disastrous-not because of 12 16 The following paragraphs on Haber rely on Macrakis, Surviving (cit. n. 6), 53-4; Albrecht and Hermann, "KWG" (cit. n. 9), 360-3; and Margit Szollosi-Janze, Fritz Haber 1868-1914: Eine Biographie (Munich, 1998 The KWG mobilized support from the Interior Ministry in the person of ministerial councillor Max Donnevert, who had been the main representative in the ministry's dealings with the KWG since early in the Weimar era. Donnevert asserted that the Interior Ministry, which had general oversight of the KWG at the Reich level, had been slighted with Jander's installation, about which it had not been consulted. He argued further that the "purely scientific character" of the institute had been diminished and pointed to the creation of undesirable foreign attention.21
Planck, for his part, argued that even from a military perspective, Jander was too much a specialist to make a long-term contribution at the institute. Once again, Planck made it clear that the KWG objected not to doing research of interest to the state but to compromising directorial prestige. To make his point, he translated the Harack Principle into the National Socialists' own jargon. "The leadership principle [Fuhrerprinzip] has always been valid" for the KWG, he wrote to the Interior Ministry. For an institute's director, Planck explained, the administration chose the best available scientist in that field and consequently gave him complete authority to conduct research and make personnel decisions. Jander's appointment, however, had broken the chain of authority, and Planck would take no responsibility for the acting director's performance. Furthermore, if the military wanted to dictate the direction of the institute, then it should provide more of that institute's funding, or at least there should be, as a quid pro quo, governmental support for the expansion of other institutes such as the KWI for Physics. 22 Several months of negotiations between the government ministries and the KWG produced a compromise of sorts: Jander remained on a temporary basis, with the un- For a non-Aryan, the affair demonstrated that any scrutiny whatsoever, even when based on specious claims, posed a danger. Similarly, the KWG learned that to maintain any control at all over the boundaries of the scientific community, it was crucial to avoid externally-conspicuous faux pas.
In the wake of the September 1933 Dahlem meeting and other examples of "lack of discipline," the KWG Administrative Committee resolved that there needed to be a vigorous reassertion of authority.32 The committee asked the Interior Ministry to reiterate its limitation on the power of workers' councils. Similarly, the administration circulated a memo over Planck's signature, backed by reference to relevant Reich decrees, reaffirming that any complaints from institute workers must be handled through the chain of authority of the directors or the KWG president-that is, not taken to outside agencies such as the NSBO.33
Thus for the KWG leadership in its initial response to the 1933 civil service law, maintenance of the boundaries of, and order in, the scientific community was of paramount concern. The society sought to minimize interference by unqualified outsiders and ad hoc organizations of subordinates, while offering comparatively little overt objection to National Socialist exclusionary policies per se. Conversely, from the National Socialist perspective, the purges were not an attack on the scientific community per se, but an effort to put this community on the same footing as all others in the new Germany. As has been noted by many historians, countervailing forces within the National Socialist state promoted the viability of science, particularly in fields relevant to rearmament, autarky, and the doctrine of a racially pure Volk. In other words, the Nazi era portended not only new rules of exclusion for science but also some opportunities for growth in accord with the community's perceived self-interest. For example, as Susanne Heim writes, the expansion of institutes, branches, and projects in plant breeding, notably including the appropriation by German researchers of scientific institutes in occupied countries, "provided many opportunities for scientists-in terms of possible discoveries as well as in terms of career."34 Such opportunities for expansion contributed to the effectiveness of the KWG's position. By conventional measures, the society proved institutionally successful: its budget almost doubled between 1933 and 1940, and sixteen new institutes or research stations were created between 1933 and 1943.35 However, in the context of National Socialism, the correlate of this institutional "success" was the dismissal of Jewish and politically-suspect personnel: preserving the freedom of science meant purging scientists.
THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Interactions between the scientific and political establishments in the Stalinist Soviet Union were more intense and contradictory than those between the establishments in the United States and Germany. In part, the differences lay in the magnitude of social changes and upheaval caused by the Russian Revolution, as well as the lengthier time period (thirty years of Stalin's rule) during which major policies did not remain stable or consistent but demonstrated dramatic turnarounds. The role of the state was also much more comprehensive in Soviet society, and thus the sphere of issues deemed "political" wider. The USSR ascribed to science a far greater political importance than did any other contemporary government, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. As a result, Soviet scientists had a strong de facto influence on politics and, in return, experienced a stronger and more diverse spectrum of political pressures.36
The USSR Academy of Sciences (AoS), so renamed in 1925 from the Russian Academy of Science, fulfilled several, not entirely compatible, functions. Symbolically, the AoS represented, and spoke in the name of, science, the undisputable authority on knowledge about nature. Honorifically, it was a learned society of the nation's most reputable scholars, elected to membership for life. Because the Soviet state did not merely inherit and seek to control science but also built up a practically new research infrastructure and establishment, AoS membership tripled over a thirtyyear period, rising from roughly 45 full members to 140, and approximately three times as many corresponding members. In the 1930s, the academy also received a crucial new governmental function, essentially becoming a ministry of science, which the government otherwise lacked. In this capacity, the AoS administered a network of the nation's top research institutions (whose combined staff increased in the period of Stalin's rule from about 1,000 to more than 10,000), appointed directors, and distributed state funds for research.37 In this expanding mode, the scientific establishment underwent changes as a result more of policies regulating inclusion than of exclusion of members.
Academic and state functions intertwined so tightly in the work of the academy that it is not possible for us today (as it certainly was not possible for contemporaries) to demarcate precisely one from another. As a learned society, the AoS enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy from the government. (For example, the academy elected its own members.) Yet as a de facto branch of government, it could experience political pressures, in principle, at any level. Whether, and how much, the state actually interfered with AoS affairs varied from situation to situation.
Arguably, the Sovietization of the AoS in 1929 constituted the most crucial case. Until that point, the academy's forty-odd members and practically all its research and technical staff were so-called bourgeois specialists, persons raised and educated prior to the revolution who were willing to collaborate with the Bolshevik government qua professionals, but politically did not have to pretend to be Communist allies or sympathizers. For eleven years following the revolution, the Bolsheviks found such a moderate degree of loyalty quite acceptable. Moreover, they placed bourgeois specialists in important positions in many governmental agencies-such as Gosplan, the State Commission for National Economic Planning. The outbreak of the "cultural revolution" in 1928 destroyed the existing pact between politicians and experts, and the government subsequently demanded more loyal, "red" experts, that is, true supporters who would share the regime's essential values.38
The academy could claim very few such experts at the time-the majority of its members were elected before the revolution according to the tsarist government loyalty standards. Like other academic institutions, the AoS faced enormous pressure from the state, media, and militant public, with some radical voices proclaiming it irredeemable and demanding its closure. The government's main strategy for change relied on inclusion, rather than exclusion: it aimed to increase the number of supporters within the AoS and help them obtain some key administrative positions. The younger generation of scientists and students contained a higher proportion of sincere sympathizers. Recruitment and promotion favored certain social groups heretofore underrepresented in science: students with a proletarian or peasant background, women, Jews and other national minorities, members of the Komsomol, and labor activists. Conversely, students from educated backgrounds and formerly privileged classes faced discrimination. The cultural revolution and the continuing expansion of scientific institutions led to a quicker-than-usual generational change. By World War II, the typical researcher possessed both a Soviet education and a Soviet mentality, although AoS members and the top of the academic hierarchy still consisted largely of scientists trained before the revolution. Some of them did join the party, but usually later, in the 1940s, in part due to the patriotic upsurge of the war. A few AoS members who worked abroad and refused to return to the Soviet Union were expelled. 44 The second significant wave of purges in the late 1930s made Communists the primary victims among the academy members. The Great Terror of 1936-1938 targeted hidden "enemies of the people" guilty of "terrorism" and "espionage," both capital crimes that carried much more severe punishments. The accused did not form any coherent group as defined by some social, class, political, or ideological position, but the main culprits usually happened to be former Soviet and party officials. Although the academic professionals suffered only marginally in comparison with military, diplomatic, and party elites, the general scale of repression during the Great Purges was so At the lower levels of the AoS hierarchy, the Great Purges operated unpredictably. Some academy institutes suffered only occasional arrests; others were hit very hard. The Pulkovo Observatory, for example, lost the majority of its leading personnel to charges of "wrecking." Since most of the country's astronomers worked there, the purges brought about a severe setback for the entire discipline.47 The arbitrary application of declared political and legal categories resulted in seemingly illogical practices and haphazard choices of victims, whose ranks included many staunch Stalinists and supporters of the regime. Despite this arbitrariness, some risk factors can be determined, such as connections with the arrested party leaders. Having foreigners among employees or extensive foreign contacts could also easily trigger accusations of espionage. Even more serious danger came from internal institutional conflicts: power struggles of any kind almost inevitably became politicized in the paranoid atmosphere and intensified to dangerous levels, usually with tragic consequences for both sides of the conflict. Overall, however, the degree of unpredictability and chaotic irrationality distinguishes the purge in the Soviet Union from the one in the United States and, especially, the one in Germany. The AoS did not even consistently follow its policy of formally excluding arrested members, sometimes simply forgetting and at other times preferring to quietly drop their names from the academy's roster.
Although the new pact with the Stalinist government required increased loyalty and subordination on the part of the academy, it also greatly increased the rewards. By the end of the 1930s, the AoS had succeeded in its long-time desire to dominate national science, having taken from other commissariats and gathered under its own administrative auspices most of the country's leading research institutes in fundamental science. In its new ministerial function, the academy expanded institutionally and received an increasing share of government support for scientific research. On the personal level, resources began to be distributed much more hierarchically during the 1930s than they had in the very egalitarian 1920s. Election to the academy effectively meant membership in the top Soviet elite and the acquisition of prestige and material privileges comparable to those received by high officials in the state and the military. Only then did the academy recoil from federal strictures. The NAS leadership still advocated a minimal response and suggested running the fellowship program under protest, but time, legal advice (which defused concerns about whether the NAS charter allowed the academy to refuse a government request), and pressure from members ultimately led the academy to take a stronger position and withdraw from long-term administration of the fellowships.64 In particular, the strenuous objections of so many academicians seemed to embolden Richards to take a firm stand. The decision, however, did not slow the spread of security requirements into science education and unclassified research. Instead, several regional, university-based consortia agreed to take over the fellowship program under the conditions specified by Congress.
In 1955, the NAS again stepped into the fray, when the Eisenhower administration requested that the academy investigate the effects of loyalty tests on unclassified research, and the NAS formed the Committee on Loyalty in Relation to Government Support of Unclassified Research. Unlike the earlier Committee on Civil Liberties, the new group took its mission seriously, working for months to formulate a major statement that insisted upon the need to end loyalty tests for scientists.65 Yet the final version of the report, released in March 1956, proved considerably blander than the original drafts. For example, in an August 1955 draft, the committee had observed sternly that "a preoccupation with the idea of security has penetrated into areas where it has no relevance" and warned of dangers that went far beyond scientific life. The "insidious identification" of conformity with loyalty, the draft stated, "is an evil thing that must be combatted by every sincere and thoughtful citizen."66 The NAS deleted these and other strongly worded statements from its public report. Gone were the sharply critical tone and the emphasis on the menace of conformist pressures. Instead, the final version relied upon a bloodless narrative about the value of basic research and highlighted the self-regulating character of science as sufficient protection for the public interest.67
The committee's report did make a small contribution toward the Eisenhower administration's 1956 decision to end the practice of loyalty testing for unclassified research. The academy's role was hardly decisive, however. By the mid-1950s, 63 McCarthyism was on the decline, the Supreme Court was dismantling the more draconian aspects of the loyalty-security system, and the United States was seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In asking the NAS to weigh in on loyalty tests, the Eisenhower administration sought legitimation for a course of action it already hoped to take-the initiative lay with the government, not with the academy.
These three incidents indicate the extent to which the NAS, despite its status as the most prestigious scientific body in the United States, failed to influence substantially the rules of inclusion and exclusion that defined science-state relations in the postWorld War II decade. Part of the explanation for this failure lies in the structure of the academy and its own internal regulation of its membership hierarchy. The NAS never came close to the kinds of purges that rocked the KWG and the AoS, in part because the U.S. organization never had official responsibilities over research institutions and large numbers of rank-and-file scientists, the main arena affected by political criteria. 
